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Abstract.
An historical consequence of power relations in European culture has been a dichotomy of
reason and emotion. This pattern did not arise in China, one of the oldest and most enduring
structures of power in human history. The social basis of the Chinese concept of xin (heartmind) is considered in the paper, and a discussion of a characteristic Chinese conception of
power is also presented.
Introduction.
Power can be understood generically as a causal factor in relations between even inanimate
objects. In collision the velocity, direction and physical structure of the things involved are
likely to be changed by the power of one to affect the other. The form here is ‘power to’.
When the things in question have wills or intentions of their own, then the power to which
they are subjected is necessarily political, ‘power over’, and may generate resistance,
rebellion or even compliance. The experience of power in such circumstances will produce a
consciousness of power which becomes a secondary factor in the relations between parties
which has an independent role in power exchanges between them.
It will be shown that the consciousness of power entails cultural constructions of the
relationship between reason and emotion which derive from socially significant institutional
frameworks. In particular, the historical trajectory of West European institutions and the
power relations implicit in them tend to culturally separate reason and emotion whereas a
contrasting consciousness, of their unity, emerged through Chinese institutional development.
These different constructions of the relationship between reason and emotion raise questions
of whether different conceptions of power might be similarly located. The paper goes on to
consider some typical conceptualisations of power in the mainstream literature and a
representative Chinese account of power.
Reason and Emotion in Power Relations.
Those who exercise power over others typically have a consciousness of it that is
qualitatively different than the consciousness of those subordinated by it. In both cases the
consciousness in question is never merely cognitive but also emotional. This is because
participation in relations of any sort requires and generates a sense of involvement which may
be positive or negative, strong or weak, but always includes an evaluation of the other, the
self and the relations between them. These evaluations register in the person’s physical
structure and their dispositions for subsequent action; they therefore constitute the indicators
of emotion, including physiological processes, feeling states and motivation. Before returning
to these issues below another consequence of power for considerations of emotion which is
an important aspect of both the consciousness of power and also emotions will be treated,
namely the dichotomy of reason and emotion that arguably derives from relations of power.

1

The association of the exercise of power with reason or rationality on the one hand
and the subordination to power with emotion on the other hand is so historically pervasive as
to constitute a cultural constant. Those who exercise power typically experience their control
of events and the people caught up in them as rational. Those who oppose the power they are
subjected to are often seen as irrational and emotional. Each side of this equation will be dealt
with separately. Cultural constants are aspects of popular consciousness that may be reflected
in academic writing.
A condition of both power and rationality, according to Max Weber, who wrote
extensively and authoritatively on both topics, is the actor’s deliberation, consciousness and
intentionality. Weber says that for an action to be rational it must follow the actor’s own
deliberative considerations, that the rational actor is free of external constraints (Weber 1975:
186). This theme, of linking rationality with the power to control, is continuous throughout
Weber’s work. In Economy and Society he says that action which is voluntary and free-willed
is rational because it is action which is not controlled but which itself controls (Weber 1978:
23-24). Power, Weber (1978: 53, 926) famously writes, is the probability that an actor can
‘realize [their] will’ or be in a ‘position to carry out [their] own will’ in spite of resistance.
What is important in all of this for our purposes is that an actor’s power and rationality,
which Weber sees as continuous factors, is for him the obverse of emotion.
Emotion is inherently irrational for Weber, and those subjected to it are without
controlling engagements of their own (see Barbalet 2001: 36-37, 53). Political ‘obedience’,
Weber (1970: 79) says, ‘is determined by highly robust motives of fear and hope’. Political
states may encourage the loyalty of those subject to them, according to Weber (1978: 269) by
‘winning glory and honour in war or by promoting their material welfare’; in neither case is
reason the effective factor. Weber’s discussion of modern or national citizenship and political
parties indicates further the notion that those subordinate to political power are mobilised by
it not through reason but emotional manipulation (Weber, 1994a: 113, 124–125; Weber,
1994b: 230; see Barbalet 2010).
Those who are subordinated to power risk being given the appellation of irrationality
and emotionality. The apparent contradiction between rationality on the one hand, and the
inner life of emotional feeling on the other, is frequently localised as an aspect of the sexual
division of labour, consisting of male power and female subordination or weakness. This
rationality/emotionality dichotomisation maps onto other relationships of power and
subordination in which colonised, junior and otherwise disabled or under resourced elements
are characterized as emotional and irrational in contradistinction to persons or groups who
possess resources or are otherwise able to exercise power and are seen as rational.
Indeed, the distinction between rationality and emotionality as symptomatic of the
direction of power and subjection has representation in historic transformations of
individuation and consciousness. In the classic phase of individuation, in Europe from the
late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, thematized in the doctrine of ‘individualism’,
selfhood is construed in terms of persons being the proprietors of their own capacities and
able managers of their own interests. Under these conditions persons are not only regarded as
independent centres of consciousness but necessarily rational. These are the elemental units
of liberal political economy. Here the political and economic capacities of which persons
have command permits an experience of control or its possibility.
A challenge to this form of individualism emerged almost parallel to it and gained
pace during the nineteenth century. The commanding power of industrialized economic
forces was seen as subverting merely human capabilities, reason was challenged as an agent
of alienated power and emotional consciousness and sensibility was instead now regarded as
the more meaningful basis of self realisation. Romanticism as a movement draws these
various strands together.
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Under conditions of late modernity experiences of self as independent of others is
intensified although without a sense that the individual is a centre of consciousness but rather
a locus of emotional feeling. This arises in the experiential shift from a sense of control or
meaningful participation in external market and politico-administrative processes to a sense
of having no such ability to influence these things. Under such circumstances selfhood is
likely to be constituted as an emotional rather than as a rational-conscious centre of being,
when a person’s controlling faculties are directed not to the external environment in which
they operate but to inner processes and especially those of emotional expressivity. These late
modern developments are background to the conventional salience of emotions that is located
in the advent of sociological and philosophical interest in emotions from the late 1970s, and
which accounts for their focus on ‘emotions management’ (Barbalet 2001: 171-176).
The culturally pervasive dichotomy of reason and emotion does not withstand
scrutiny. Reason, for example, requires emotion, although not necessarily those labile,
visceral and self-projecting emotions privileged in the conventional construction of the
category ‘emotion’ (Barbalet 2011a). The radical distinction between reason and emotion that
since Plato at least has been an enduring feature of what might loosely be called Western
thought has been challenged by a substantial literature in neurology (Damasio 1994),
philosophy (de Sousa 1987; Nussbaum 2003) and sociology (Barbalet 2001). A striking
feature of this recent literature, as one commentator has noted, ‘is the almost total absence of
reference to Asian thought’ (Marks 1991: 1).
Reason and Emotion Combined in Xin.
In contrast to the radical separation and antithesis of reason and emotion in mainstream
Western thought there is in the Chinese intellectual tradition an implicit assumption of the
unity of thought and emotion, expressed through a single concept, xin, which literally
translates as ‘heart-mind’. According to Benjamin Schwartz (1985: 184) the concept of xin
‘plays a crucial role in the discourse of the [formative period of Chinese philosophy] … and
the subsequent development of Chinese thought’. He goes on to say that the concept of xin
must be understood as ‘the centre of will, emotion, desire, and intellect (both rational and
intuitive)’ (Schwartz 1985: 184).
For over 3,000 years, then, Chinese intellectual traditions have treated reason and
emotion as co-existing within a single faculty through the notion of xin. In all of its
applications in classical Chinese literatures xin embraces both rational or intellectual and
emotional aspects in combination, and in Chinese understanding reason and emotion are not
separate and independent in the familiar Western sense. In all major Chinese thinkers there is
a shared recognition of the unity of both intellectual and emotional qualities which are
internal to xin. It is not possible here to provide a detailed exposition of the treatment of xin
in Chinese thought (see Qi 2011: 252-91). More relevant for the present discussion is to show
how different historical configurations of societal power relations are responsible for these
contrasting currents of the relationship between rationality and emotion.
Sociological explanations of the separation of emotion and reason in Western
development focus on the predominance of instrumental rationality principally sponsored by
market relations and institutions. Agnes Heller (1979: 185) describes a dual structure of
capitalism in which there is a distinction between the ‘domain of the market [as] the world of
instrumental rationality’, on the one hand and the ‘domain of the family [as] the world of
emotional “inwardness”’ on the other. Georg Simmel (1971: 328-9) similarly indicates that
urban and market relationships both depend on and generate a calculative or instrumental
orientation which displace emotion as a ‘reason’ for acting and as a motivational force in the
relations between people. Under those circumstances these relations become impersonal and
thus ‘instead of reacting emotionally, the metropolitan type reacts primarily in a rational
3

manner’ (Simmel 1971: 326). In this way the instrumentalism derived from capitalistic
markets and the power relations in them produces the culturally pervasive separation of
emotion from reason. It might be added parenthetically that Simmel is not arguing that
emotion ceases to operate under conditions of market rationality: the mechanism which
truncates emotional efficacy is an emotion that is an antidote to emotional expression, what
Simmel calls the ‘blasé feeling’ (Simmel 1971: 326).
It is of interest that in an early modern text written at a time when market society was
becoming important in Scotland but still influenced by the clan structure of the Highlands,
Adam Ferguson (1966) characterises the relations between emotions and reason as nonoppositional and in a way reminiscent of the Chinese concept of xin. Ferguson (1966: 29)
says:
... there is a felicity of conduct in human affairs, in which it is difficult to distinguish
the promptitude of the head from the ardour and sensibility of the heart. Where both
are united, they constitute that superiority of mind, the frequency of which among
men, in particular ages and nations, much more than the progress they have made in
speculation, or in the practice of mechanical and liberal arts, should determine the rate
of their genius, and assign the palm of distinction and honour.
The implicit comparative perspective in Ferguson, of the encroaching market with its
privileging of a rationality separated from emotion, on the one hand, and the martial and
heroic society of the Highland clans in which passion and action were united, on the other,
suggests distinct types of societal systems which contribute to the different forms of
relationship between emotion and reason treated in this article.
The advantage of comparison, but with a much longer historical reach than
Ferguson’s, is employed in a discussion of patriarchy in Western Europe and China that
supports the type of explanation presented here regarding the variable relationship between
emotion and reason. Gary Hamilton (1990) shows that the constitution and developmental
potential of patriarchy in European and in Chinese societies were fundamentally different.
Western patriarchy, he says, is tied to ‘the symbolic structure of authority underlying Western
religions, particularly Christianity and Judaism’ (Hamilton 1990: 93). A legacy of Western
patriarchy, then, is a conceptualization of power ‘viewed as a positive force, emanating from
the will of the superior – from the father, the priest, or the ruler’ (Hamilton 1990: 93).
Hamilton does not develop the point but a corollary of his argument is that a corresponding
conception of power in political and legal practices is related to a notion of rationality which
has an imperative over and against emotional feelings.
Chinese patriarchy, instead of emphasising the instrumental power of a superior,
Hamilton (1990: 93) says, ‘places the stress on the subordinate’s duty to obey (hsiao), assigns
role obligations that signify his or her submission to duty (e.g. mourning rites), and restricts
legitimate acts of power and obedience to behaviour in role sets (e.g., father/son,
emperor/subjects, husband/wife)’. We should recognise these relations as those set out by
Confucius. Indeed, Hamilton (1990: 93) says that ‘this depersonalised form of patriarchy is in
turn justified by the belief that it is the duty of all individuals to conform to their roles in
order to maintain the harmony of the whole’. While this discussion associates the structure of
relations with a doctrine, Confucianism, it is understood that the doctrine legitimates but does
not generate the form of relationships in which behaviour is prescribed by the obligations of
interlocking roles. Before considering the underlying social structure Hamilton alludes to, it
can be noted that the form of role-power characteristic of Chinese patriarchy does not force a
separation of emotion and reason but relies on their unity.
The traditional agrarian structure of Chinese society underlies an orientation toward
family and kinship. While the Chinese peasant is a ‘sufficient unit to provide the necessary
and minimum social co-operation in everyday economic pursuits’ (Fei 1946: 2), the gentry,
4

on the other hand, find it necessary to organise beyond the immediate family into kinship
groups in order to both secure their rule over peasants and also maintain their advantaged
position – through clan organisation – in Chinese society. Kinship or clan organisation
provides the gentry with a security required because they are ‘an economically unproductive
class living upon privileges [which makes them] politically vulnerable’ (Fei 1946: 4).
Kinship or clan organisation provides the gentry with a capacity to preserve their land and
privilege through alliance formations that are based on common family name or association.
Patricia Ebrey and James Watson (1986: 1) summarise such a situation: ‘Throughout the
imperial period, not only were family and kinship of major importance to ordinary people, as
they have been everywhere, but they were central to the practical, political, and ethical
concerns of the elite’.
Kinship organisation or clan operates through the observance of its member’s moral
obligations and their fulfilment of reputational requirements, associated with such things as
‘face’. In this type of society dispute resolution does not focus on enforcing ‘an abstract
moral law’ but on the arbitration of ‘a compromise’ (Grief and Tabellini 2010: 137). Moral
obligations and reconciliation within a kinship group or clan relationship require the
involvement of both familial attachment and the emotional feelings associated with it, and
also the cognitive considerations of responsibility and the judgements of moral duty and code.
Here emotion feelings and reasoned deliberation are seen as inseparable, working together in
delivering a unified outcome. In doing so there is no organisational or cultural force
distinguishing them as separate or opposed faculties.
The corresponding European experience was quite different. The Church discouraged
tribal or clan tendencies and operated with a marriage dogma that undermined large kinship
organisations by proscribing such practices as adoption, polygamy, concubinage, marriages
among distant kin, and marriages without the woman’s consent (Grief 2006: 308-312). By the
ninth century the nuclear family predominated. Legal codes no longer linked rights and
kinship (Grief and Tabellini 2010: 137). Generalised morality and the absence of kin groups
by the tenth century led to a distinct trajectory of societal organisation (Grief 2005; 2006).
These culminated in the formation of independent cities and the market economy, with the
consequences for instrumental rationality and the cultural representation of the opposition of
emotions and reason noted above. Such developments did not occur in China. One
consequence of this, as Grief and Tabellini (2010: 139) note, is that ‘kinship groups remain a
more important conduit for economic exchange in China’. Family enterprises are prevalent in
China, and market relationships involve both instrumentality and attachment. Guanxi, which
is significant in business relations (Gold, Guthrie and Wank 2002; Hermann-Pillath 2009),
entails involvement of both emotion and reason. In these ways there is continuity from
imperial to present-day China (Peng 2005) and the continuing provision of a social basis for
non-opposition of emotion and reason in institutions and also in cultural representation.
The contrasting positions described here, concerning the relationship of emotion and
reason in European and Chinese mainstream thought, derive from differences in social and
constitutional structure and in the social relations of power and their institutional bases in the
respective developments of these societies. The emphasis on power as an attribute of
individuals, the enforcement of formal law and the development of the capitalist market in
Western Europe encourage the distinction between and opposition of emotion and reason.
The formation of social power in the obligations of roles in relationships, the constitution of
moral obligations within family and the dominance of kinship group and clan relationships in
China, on the other hand, lead to the integration of emotion and reason and the absence of a
sense of one being privileged over the other.
A Chinese Conception of Power.
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Having explained the different cultural conceptualizations of the relationship between
rationality and emotion in terms of the historical development of societal structures of power
it can now be asked whether there is a distinctive conceptualisation of power itself in Chinese
traditions.
The academic literature concerning power tends to operate in terms of distinctions
within the concept of power itself. An historically important understanding of power as an
actor’s ‘present means, to obtain some future apparent good’, provided by the seventeenth
century founder of modern political philosophy Thomas Hobbes (1962: 43), has generated a
continuing debate concerning whether capacities and resources (‘present means’) or
outcomes (‘some future apparent good’) are the sine qua non of power. In a much more
recent development Stephen Lukes’ widely used presentation of three dimensions of power
(Lukes 1974) distinguishes between a first dimension of power expressed through explicit
decisions that tends to be coercive and generative of conflict, a second dimension expressed
through a manipulation of the environment in which the decisions of others are constrained,
and a third dimension expressed through the dissemination of ideologies or values which
affect the motivations or interests of others.
It is also necessary to mention a distinction between hard and soft power that much
has recently been made of in international relations theory (Gallarotti 2011). The concept of
soft power emphasizes the importance of cooption and persuasion rather than the coercive
exercise of military might in the relations between states (Nye 2004). A preference of
dominant states for the exercise of soft power rather than hard would make a difference to the
climate of world politics; but the analytic distinction on which it is conceptualized is not
novel nor does the notion of soft power contribute to a theory of power that departs from the
mainstream. The means of power have consistently been described in social theory in terms
of three types: coercion or physical means, utilitarian means including positive or negative
incentives and benefits, and normative means including persuasion, opinion and values
(Russell 1938; Neumann 1950; Etzioni 1964). The notion of soft power emphasises the last
of these to the relative exclusion of the other two.
The tripartite distinction of power-means readily maps onto Lukes’ three-dimensions
of power, in which the first or behavioural dimension can be seen as coercive, the second or
quasi-behavioural dimension in which the parameters of behaviour are manipulated is parallel
to incentive provision, and the third or non-behavioural dimension in which wants are
generated corresponds with values and norms as means of power. Irrespective of whatever
means is applied power is understood in all of these and similar approaches as a polar
relationship in which the realisation of an actor’s capacities achieves an objective against
another which they will. Additionally, power in this sense is almost always a zero-sum
relationship insofar as the power exercised by A over B corresponds to B’s loss of power to
A.
The conception of power in Chinese intellectual traditions is by no means unitary
(Jullien 1995). At one extreme is a conception of power reminiscent of the one outlined
above, namely the Legalist notion of power that emerged with the founding of the Chinese
empire in the second century BC, focused on political rule. According to the systematizer of
Legalist thought, Han Feizi, a ruler’s power (shi) operates in terms of the polar elements of
human nature, namely aversion to punishment and satisfaction in benevolence, which
constitute ‘the two handles’ of an emperor’s rule (Ames 1983: 88-94). While the Legalist
tradition is important in the history of Chinese political thought it has had no continuing
developmental significance. A quite different and philosophically richer understanding of
power is in Daodejing, a text written approximately 3,000 years ago and perennially drawn
upon in Chinese political philosophy (Gao and Gong 1995; Lai 2000, 2008; Moeller 2006).
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The point of view articulated in Daodejing operates in terms of paradox and the
notion of a paradox of power is indicated on a number of levels in the text. First, the
statement of the concept of power draws attention to a paradox of strategy in power relations.
Secondly, the theory of power in Daodejing paradoxically does not depend on the concept of
power indicated in it but on factors which effectively render this concept of power misleading.
In what follows the concept of power as a paradox of strategy will be outlined. Next, an
exposition of the broader theory of power in Daodejing which informs Chinese political
thought will be provided.
The concept of power in Daodejing is relatively well known and can be simply stated.
It operates in terms of a paradoxical strategy described in Chapter 36 as ‘subtle discernment’,
namely that the ‘submissive and weak will overcome the hard and the strong’ (Laozi 1963:
41). This conception of power is expressed in terms of two sets of metaphors, of water and
the feminine. While water is formless and compliant it can wear down mountains, as in
chapter 78: ‘In the world there is nothing more submissive and weak than water. Yet for
attacking that which is hard and strong nothing can surpass it’ (Laozi 1963: 85; see also 41,
50). This general principle is expressed in the form of a sexual metaphor in chapter 61, where
it is asserted that the strategic advantage of states can be preserved if in their relation with
other states they do not contend but take the ‘lower position’: ‘In the union of the world, the
female always gets the better of the male by stillness. Being still, she takes the lower position’
(Laozi 1963: 68; see also 73). The paradox of power, then, is that the weaker party is
effectively and paradoxically more powerful than the stronger.
The concept of power represented here, as one which indicates the strategic
advantages of avoiding confrontation, as in Daodejing chapters 69 and 73 (Laozi 1963: 76,
80), of persuasion rather than force, of leading by following as in chapter 66 (Laozi 1963: 73),
tends to suggest that it can be seen as an early formulation of the notion of soft power. We
shall see that this is not an adequate understanding of the concept. Another possibility is that
this conception of power, rather than a characterisation of means of power, summarised as
‘soft power’, refers to a category of empirical situations or outcomes of power relations.
Without referring to this Chinese tradition Jack Hirshleifer discusses a situation he
describes as the ‘paradox of power’: ‘In conflictual interactions ... we might ordinarily expect
the strong to grow even stronger and the weak weaker. Nevertheless, surprisingly often,
initially weaker or poorer contenders end up gaining on initially stronger or wealthier
opponents. This is the paradox of power’ (Hirshleifer 2001: 44). Here the paradox of power is
explained in terms of differences between contenders in the ‘the marginal payoff of
conflictual effort’ (Hirshleifer 2001: 66), which is to say that under certain circumstances
weaker contenders may fight harder because more highly motivated than the stronger.
Hirschleifer’s paradox of power, then, is behavioural. In Daodejing it is methodological.
Before explicating this difference the circumstantial emotions can be indicated.
The underlying emotional force of Hirschleifer’s paradox of power is the weaker
party’s resolute confidence and optimism. One close reader of Daodejing, A.C. Graham, sees
its sustaining emotional commitment as a quite different one, namely abject fear. Graham’s
summary of Daodejing in general refers also to its conception of power in particular:
[Daodejing’s] interweaving of metaphors, water, valley, root, gate, mother, the Way
itself as only another of them, is not the illustration of abstract thoughts, it is the
thinking itself. Lao-tzu is the masterpiece of a kind of intelligence at the opposite pole
from the logical. It concentrates instead of explicating, starkly juxtaposes instead of
filling in gaps ... At the root of the thinking, pervading this book of evasions and
retreats disguised as a pseudonym, is one dominant emotion, fear ... The pressing
concern is with how the small state and the small man survive in a world of
murderously competing powers (Graham 1999: 218).
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Fear, of course, is typically characterised in terms of flight or withdrawal. But it is not clear
that the degree to which that withdrawal which is implicit in the paradox of power in
Daodejing is based on fear.
Juxtaposition is a currency in Daodejing, as Graham indicates in the above quotation.
Juxtaposition and paradox here are not symptomatic of fear, however, but are elements of a
philosophical methodology that relates to the issue of change and what can be made of it. The
underlying emotion associated with this latter position is not fear or similar negative
prospective emotions but rather those positive prospective emotions that arise out of a sense
of preparedness concerning and acceptance of change that characterises much of Chinese
philosophy, expressed in a foundational text Yijing (Book of Changes) (Lynn 1994: 51, 56,
64-5, 77). In order to develop this line of reasoning it is important to consider the method of
paradox in Daodejing.
There are many distinct readings of Daodejing: it has been read as a self-cultivation
manual, religious tract, proto-scientific exposition, and handbook of political advice.
Irrespective of these different concerns a crucial dimension of Daodejing is its method of
paradox, which saturates the text. Daodejing begins with the paradox of language: ‘The dao
that can be described in language is not the constant dao; the name that can be given is not its
constant name’ (Laozi 1999: 51). Language is an inadequate instrument for describing reality,
the names it provides to things are insufficient to capture those things; also, language ‘freezes’
objects which change, and language itself fails to note or track such changes. Language is
used to account for a thing and delineate its features, but it tends instead to hold constant in
thought what has already changed in reality.
There is more. Contrasting couples can be located throughout the text: Dao and de or
generality and specificity, sagacity and ignorance (Laozi 1963: 23), self-effacement and
illustriousness (Laozi 1963: 27), female and male (Laozi 1963: 33), the submissive and the
powerful (Laozi 1963: 50), and so on. This is widely taken to imply that in its evaluation of
the items presented in such dyads the lower or weaker side is supported against the higher or
stronger side (Lau 1963: xix; Schwartz 1985: 203). This interpretation indicates a good deal
about the social perspective and political stand of Daodejing. Chad Hansen adds a
methodological dimension, however, when he notes:
The emphasis on wu, submissiveness, the Yin, female, dark, water-like values is not
there because these distinctions are constant. It is there only as a heuristic corrective
to our conventional presuppositions of what has positive value (Hansen 1992: 225).
Hansen here suggests two important qualifications to the more conventional reading of the
treatment of contrasting qualities in Daodejing. First, the conceptual dyads should not be seen
as referring to enduring relationships. Indeed, it is frequently mentioned in Daodejing that
there is no constancy in things themselves or in the relations between them. The easy
becomes difficult, the weak become strong; each condition is necessarily temporary and
yields to a different and frequently contrasting condition (Laozi 1963: 6, 70, 71, 83). The
second thing Hanson mentions, implied in the first but less frequently noted in the literature,
is that the conventional or prevailing perception of worldly qualities can benefit from an
agnostic perspective, which Daodejing provides.
Daodejing, then, points not to the moral virtue or social and political value of
subordination over domination, as a political reading of the text supposes, but to the paradox
that the limitations of insufficiency, for instance, may not be greater than the problems of
abundance. But even this reading of Daodejing is incomplete. The method of the text is not
simply to locate and identify paradox. It is to provide a comprehensive account of the
unending process of paradox in paradoxical integration. The term ‘integration’ here indicates
not a resolution of or solution to any given paradox, but the non-contradictory or nondestructive correspondence of opposites in a single thing or event at a given moment in time.
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Paradoxes are never finally resolved, according to Daodejing, but continually reproduced in
the unending flux and process of the world. The concept of paradoxical integration, then, is
arguably the most significant feature of Daodejing, even though seldom systematically
treated or appreciated. It is a concept that not only underlies the theory of power in Daodejing
but also functions as a wide-spread and historically important psychological factor in China
through which hardships are seen as if not temporary at least non-enduring (Lusthaus 1990:
207).
Wuwei: Action, Power and Change.
Having considered the paradox of power as a strategy, in which weakness overcomes strength,
and as a methodology, which assumes that there is no permanence in the world including in
the capacities or circumstances of actors, it is now possible to more fully indicate the theory
of power in Daodejing. It has been shown that the concept of power as a paradox of strategy
emphasises the actor’s propensity to withdraw, disengage or otherwise indicate incapacity
through non-assertiveness or self-effacement. A concept coterminous with this notion in
Daodejing is wuwei, variously translated as non-action, effortless or non-coercive action
(Barbalet 2011b: 339). We shall see that the concept of wuwei as an understanding of action
fills out the theory of power in Daodejing.
Action is ordinarily understood as terms of the actor’s intentions to achieve a future
outcome they desire. Power is then a particular type of action. But action in this sense is the
practical obverse of wuwei. In the second chapter of Daodejing it is stated that: ‘The sages
develop things but do not initiate them, they act on behalf of things but do not lay any claim
to them, they see things through to fruition but do not take credit for them’ (Laozi 2003: 80).
As well as constituting action that does not direct the relations it facilitates, wuwei, according
to chapter 63, is action that is timely and therefore understands the sequences of the events it
nurtures: ‘Take account of the difficult while it is still easy, and deal with the large while it is
still tiny. The most difficult things in the world originate with the easy, and the largest issues
originate with the tiny’ (Laozi 2003: 175). The idea represented here, that any moment or
event is part of a larger unfolding process, which is inherent in classical Chinese thought as
noted above, relies on the notion that energy flows, qi, animates movement between temporal
phases.
This general theme is continued in chapter 64, although the perspective shifts from an
understanding of the process to the correlative restraint on the actor: ‘Those who would do
things ruin them; those who would control things lose them ... because the sages do things
non-coercively they do not ruin them, and because they do not try to control things they do
not lose them’ (Laozi 2003: 178). In each of these statements and others wuwei is action that
is appropriate to the inherent dynamic of what is acted on, subordinating the actor’s
extraneous and self-centred purposes in order to realise the full potential of events as they
unfold under appropriate stewardship or careful management.
The idea of wuwei as being commensurate with the nature of the thing towards which
the action is directed, implicit above, means that if the nature of something is understood,
then action towards it can be appropriate and timely – neither premature nor too late, as in
chapter 64: ‘Deal with a situation before it happens; bring it under control before it gets out
of hand’ (Laozi 2003: 177). This acknowledgment of a dynamic dimension and unfolding of
events, which means that things become other than they were and will become other than
they are, is a source of paradox that Daodejing addresses and exemplifies throughout, as we
have seen. Another form of paradox, the paradox of strategy, has also been identified and
discussed above.
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There is a further element of wuwei as a form of action that is important here, which is
wuwei as example to others. This idea, represented in chapters 2 and 43, can be more fully
quoted to indicate its presupposition in paradoxical relations:
Determinacy and indeterminacy give rise to each other,
Difficult and easy complement each other...
It is for this reason that sages keep to service that does not entail coercion
And disseminate teachings that go beyond what can be said.
[…]
Rare are those in the world who reach an understanding of the benefits of
teaching that go beyond what can be said, and of doing things non-coercively
(Laozi 2003: 80, 145).
The idea of teachings ‘that go beyond what can be said’ suggests that another person’s action
can be achieved by example. Not only does this indicate a particular form of power, it
expresses the idea of rulership frequently indicated in Daodejing and characteristic of much
Chinese political thought which holds that government or organisation provides a context for
spontaneity in others, as in chapter 57: ‘We do things non-coercively (wuwei) and the
common people develop along their own lines’ (Laozi 2003: 166). The educative role of
wuwei, action that is effective in the example it provides to another, can be seen to have
efficacy in at least two senses. Action as example is conduct of one that animates another;
also, action as example means that the different positions or roles in any given situation
participate together in the realisation of an outcome. Both of these understandings of action
presuppose interconnectedness in the world and in agency, through which wuwei is realized.
This account of action and power bears a superficial resemblance to the idea,
associated with the work of Anthony Giddens (1979), of ‘interactional power’ and power as a
‘transformative capacity’ of action. According to this approach all agents in power relations
exercise transformative capacities: ‘Power, in this relational sense, concerns the capability of
actors to secure outcomes where the realisation of these outcomes depends upon the agency
of others’ (Giddens 1979: 93). The difference between agents with power over others and
agents subject to the power of others is centred on who complies with whose wants. But this
depends on the difference in resources mobilised by agents, confusingly expressed by
Giddens as the difference in transformative capacities between agents: ‘structures of
domination involve asymmetries of resources employed in the sustaining of power relations
in and between systems of interaction’ (Giddens 1979: 93). It will be clear that Giddens’
departure from what might be called ‘positional’ approaches to power, which operates in
terms of means or resources for power, is not fundamental. It will also be apparent that the
interactions referred to in Giddens’ interaction approach are those between discrete actors
with little attention paid to the interaction agents have not only with each other but with the
context or framework in which inter-agentic relations occur, emphasized in the Chinese
approach treated here.
From this account a number of elements of action that are identified in Daodejing,
and which have wider currency in Chinese thought, can be contrasted with the conception of
action in mainstream social theories. Three themes in particular emerge in the conception of
action set out here. First, the thing or event acted upon is never regarded as inert, passive or
without its own agentic capacity; second, no actor is independent of other actors and nonactors, but is interconnected with them in various ways; third, things are subordinate to the
processes through which they have manifestation, and these processes are dynamic and things
in them are ever becoming different. These background ideas inform the notion of wuwei as
non-interfering action which accommodates to social processes, as non-wilful action directed
to realising the potential of events and others, and as action that animates others to act on
their own behalf. In all of these wuwei is not self-assertive but self-effacing or ‘weak’. Thus
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the concept of wuwei implies an approach to action and power that is not only quite different
from standard mainstream treatments but that arguably offers a broader grasp of the issues
raised by action and power.
Wuwei, as effortless or non-coercive action, intervenes in events in a manner that does
not confront or operate in tension with them but rather accommodates to them. This requires
that wuwei as action cannot be described principally in terms of the actor’s intentions or
capacities but in terms of the thing acted upon and the processes to which it is subjected:
synchronicity through action as wuwei replaces the notion of causality in power. This requires
that those who practice wuwei are aware of the relationships that constitute the objects of
their concern more than they are of their own interests. The conception of action that
underlies the theory of power in Daodejing can therefore be seen as departing from standard
approaches on a number of crucial points.
Conclusion.
The emotional underscore of action and power in Daodejing is not fear, as Graham suggests,
but confidence born of an understanding of the processes of change to which persons and
things are subjected and also the feeling of satisfaction in realising the potential in events and
others. The separation of emotion and reason that is familiar in standard approaches and
challenged in recent thought does not arise in Daodejing, or in classical Chinese thought at all,
as shown above. While the strategy of the paradox of power in Daodejing bears a superficial
resemblance to the concept of soft power, it has been shown in the present paper that the
theory of power in Daodejing is not properly speaking a precursor to the notion of soft power,
which addresses the means of power, but operates in terms of a methodology of paradox
which emphasizes change and the ever likely transformation of the agent’s capacities through
developments in their environment, as indicated in the discussion above.
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